Most analyses of the U.S. Great Moderation have been based on VAR methods, and have consistently pointed toward good luck as the main explanation for the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years. Using data generated by a New-Keynesian model in which the only source of change is the move from passive to active monetary policy, we show that VARs may misinterpret good policy for good luck. In particular, we detect significant breaks in estimated VAR innovation variances, although in the data generating process the volatilities of the structural shocks are constant across policy regimes. Counterfactual simulations, structural and reduced-form, point toward the incorrect conclusion of good luck. Our results cast doubts on the notion that existing VAR evidence is inconsistent with the good policy explanation of the Great Moderation.
Introduction
Post-WWII U.S. economic history is usually divided into two distinct periods. The first period, which extends up to the end of the Volcker disinflation, is characterised by macroeconomic turbulence, with highly volatile output growth, and highly volatile and persistent inflation. The most recent period, from the end of the Volcker disinflation to the present day, is marked, in contrast, by significantly smaller volatilities of both inflation and output growth and, possibly, by a lower extent of inflation persistence.
1 These dramatic changes in the reduced-form properties of the U.S. economy over the last several decades are known as the 'Great Moderation'.
A vast empirical literature has investigated the source(s) of the Great Moderation in an attempt to disentangle the relative contributions of two main explanations: good policy and good luck. Based on (time-varying) structural VAR methods, the good luck hypothesis has been advocated by a number of authors including Stock and Watson (2002) , Primiceri (2005) , Canova and Gambetti (2005) , Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) and Sims and Zha (2006) for the U.S., and by Benati (2006a) for the U.S., the Euro area, and the U.K.. Based on an estimated sticky-price model of the U.S. economy, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) find, in contrast, support for the good policy explanation advocated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , according to which a shift in the systematic component of monetary policy has been the driving force behind the recent macroeconomic stability.
This paper tries to reconcile the conflicting results of the two strands of the literature by asking whether the differences in the methods between the two approaches can account for the differences in the results. To investigate the ability of VARs to identify the sources of the Great Moderation, we use as data generation process a standard sticky-price New Keynesian model in which the only source of change is the move from passive to active monetary policy.
2 1 See Kim and Nelson (1999) , McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) , Kim, Nelson, and Piger (2004) , Stock and Watson (2002) , Cogley and Sargent (2002) , Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Stock (2002) . 2 As we abstract from the role of fiscal policy, the relationship between the monetary policy stance and equilibrium (in)determinacy in a plain New-Keynesian model is one-to-one, with a passive (active) rule associated with an indeterminate (determinate) equilibrium. As shown by Leeper (1991) , in more complex settings this is not the case.
We simulate the model under both policy regimes and apply widely used reducedform and structural estimation techniques on the simulated data. Can VAR methods uncover the good policy explanation that we have constructed? The answer is 'No'.
In particular, we find that:
• Based on bootstrapped critical values, estimated VAR innovation variances exhibit large and significant instability across policy regimes, even in the absence, by construction, of any change in the volatilities of the structural shocks in the data generating process. VAR coefficients, on the other hand, exhibit significant instability only in the interest rate equation.
• Counterfactual simulations -both structural and reduced-form-strongly point towards the incorrect conclusion that monetary policy played no role.
It is worth emphasizing that earlier contributions have concluded that good luck has been the driving force of the Great Moderation on the basis of this kind of findings. Results very similar to those obtained on actual data are produced, in this paper, within a framework in which the change in macroeconomic dynamics is driven exclusively by improved monetary policy.
We identify two main dimensions along which VAR results can be misleading.
First, changes in the monetary policy rule of the DSGE model have an impact on both the covariance matrix and the coefficients of the VAR representation of the model. In particular, the impact of the policy shift on the VAR covariance matrix can dominate the impact on the VAR coefficients. Previous literature, however, has routinely interpreted changes in the volatilities of the VAR innovations as evidence against good policy and in favor of good luck. Second, changes in the interest rate equation of a structural VAR bear no clear-cut relationship with changes in the parameters of the monetary policy rule of the underlying DSGE model. Earlier contributions, in contrast, have performed counterfactual simulations in structural VARs under the presumption that switching the estimated coefficients of the interest rate equations provides a reasonable approximation to switching the parameters of the monetary policy rule in the underlying DSGE model. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares, for the United Kingdom, the results from Bayesian time-varying parameter structural VARs with results coming from a more traditional 'narrative-historical' approach. The U.K. experience is particularly interesting here because, different from the U.S., narrative evidence strongly suggest that improved monetary policy played a significant role in fostering the recent macroeconomic stability, whereas the VAR evidence strongly supports the notion of a more favorable macroeconomic environment in the form of smaller shocks.
Section 3 outlines the strategy of our experiment, briefly describes the standard New
Keynesian sticky-price model and then motivates our focus on the position of Clarida, Galì, and Gertler (2000) . Section 4 presents results based on reduced-form methods.
In Section 5, we estimate structural VARs based on the simulated data, identifying the structural shocks via the sign restrictions implied by the New Keynesian model.
In Section 6, we investigate some of the reasons why structural VAR methods have difficulty uncovering the true source of changes in the data generating process. Section 7 concludes.
The U.K. experience
The literature on the Great Moderation has been dominated, so far, by a strictly econometric approach based on either reduced-form techniques, as in Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) , or on structural methods, as in Primiceri (2005) , Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) and Sims and Zha (2006) . But econometric evidence is not the only kind of evidence we can rely on.
Historical and 'narrative' evidence, which for instance details the evolution of the intellectual climate surrounding monetary policymaking, may provide useful insights into the relative merits of 'good luck' and 'good policy' as the driving force of the recent macroeconomic stability. 
Results from time-varying parameters structural VARs
The In principle, it is possible to entertain the position that all this has just been a lucky coincidence. On the basis of the narrative evidence available for the U.K., however, we find it hard to believe that the improvements in monetary policy making played no role at all in fostering macroeconomic stability. The inconsistency between narrative and empirical evidence poses a serious challenge for the ability of VAR methods to assess the relative merits of the good luck and good policy explanations of the Great Moderation.
3 Assessing VAR studies of the Great Moderation
Our goal is to assess the ability of VAR analyses to determine the role that monetary policy played in a specific historical episode, the Great Moderation. To this end, we design the following experiment:
Suppose that the Great Moderation in the United States was due exclusively to monetary policy, with a passive policy regime in place before October 1979 and an active policy regime in place after. Would (structural) VARs be capable of uncovering the data generating process?
As we will see, the answer is 'No'. When applied to a data generation process (henceforth, DGP) which, by construction, switches from passive to active monetary policy, structural VAR methods strongly point towards good luck as the explanation for the changes in the DGP.
A model for monetary policy analysis
We use the standard New Keynesian sticky-price model surveyed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003) . In spite of its 'bare bones' structure, there are several reasons for preferring this model to more sophisticated ones (e.g., Smets
and Wouters (2007) or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) ). In particular, its simplicity allows us to highlight the conceptual issues involved in the present exercise, without the unnecessary complications of more complex structures. Such a simplicity makes it possible to obtain analytical solutions under both policy regimes. This is particularly important for the case of passive policy, as it eliminates the need to resort to the approximated numerical solution described in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) .
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The model is given by
where x t , π t , R t , g t , and u t are the output gap, inflation, the interest rate, a demand disturbance, and a cost push shock. The output gap is defined as the difference between output and the level consistent with flexible prices. All variables are expressed as log-deviations from a non-stochastic steady-state.
With a few exceptions discussed below, our calibration of the parameters of the model closely follows Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) . Specifically, we set β = 0.99, κ = 0.3, and τ = 1. The parameters of the monetary policy rule are the 'baseline estimates' reported in Table II of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) : φ π = 2.15, φ x = 0.93, and ρ R = 0.79 for the active regime, and φ π = 0.83, φ x = 0.1, and ρ R = 0.68 for the passive regime. 8 As Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) do not report estimates for the remaining structural parameters, we set ρ g = ρ u = 0.9, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks to σ g = σ u = 1, and σ R = 0.25. Together with the structural parameters, the passive (active) policy implies indeterminacy (determinacy) in the former (latter) regime. In order to make our results as transparent as possible, under the passive regime we set the variance of sunspot shocks to zero.
Modelling the policy shift
In the controlled experiment, we design a decline in macroeconomic volatilities that is driven exclusively by a change in the systematic component of monetary policy. In 8 According to Table II in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , under the passive regime the parameter φ x should in fact be 0.27. This is the only departure from their 'baseline estimates'. Setting φ x in the passive regime to the value in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) implies that the impact of a cost-push shock on the output gap would have different signs under the two regimes, and therefore it would create an obvious problem for the implementation of the sign restrictions method in Section 5. The problem disappears, however, setting φ x = 0.1 in the passive regime.
contrast, the standard deviations of the structural innovations, including the policy shocks, are kept constant across regimes. In the jargon of the literature on the Great Moderation, we are thus constructing a world of 'bad policy' before October 1979, and 'good policy' after 1982. The question we then ask is: are VAR methods capable of uncovering the 'truth' that we have constructed?
Our focus on the policy regime shift advocated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) is motivated by two main considerations.
First, the dichotomy active-passive policy allows a researcher to define the notion of 'bad policy' in a precise and meaningful way. Within the active policy region, in fact, the modelling choice is limited, at the very best, between good policy and slightly better policy. Second, as we will show in Section 4, the move from passive to active policy can indeed generate a sizable fall in macroeconomic volatility such as to replicate the key qualitative features of the Great Moderation. 9 We present estimates based on 10,000 simulations of the model under both the active and passive policy regimes. The only exception is represented by the tests for structural breaks at unknown points in the sample for both the VAR innovation variances and the coefficients of the VAR equations, which being based on bootstrapped critical values are computationally very intensive. In this case, and only in this case, results are based on 1,000 simulations and, for each simulation, the number of bootstrap replications is also set to 1,000. The sample length is set to T = 100 under both regimes.
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4 Reduced-form evidence Instability of estimated innovation variances in (Markov-switching or time-varying parameters) VARs has been interpreted, so far, as strong evidence in favor of good luck and against good policy. In this section, we investigate the extent to which this 9 If policy shifts are modelled as stochastic, Davig and Leeper (2007) , and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006) show that the mapping between policy activism and equilibrium determinacy becomes more complex. Interestingly, however, a move from passive to active policy is still capable of replicating the Great Moderation in their settings.
10 In order to reduce as much as possible dependence from the initial conditions, we run a 100 periods long 'pre-simulation', which we then discard. interpretation is warranted. For the two policy regimes, the Panel (a) of Figure 1 plots the distributions of the estimated VAR total prediction variances while panels (b) to (d) plot the distributions of the estimated volatilities of the reduced-form innovations to the three VAR equations.
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In spite of the fact that the volatilities of the structural innovations are kept constant in the DSGE model, both the total prediction variance and the volatilities of the innovations to the inflation and output gap equations in the VAR exhibit a remarkable instability across policy regimes. The evidence for the interest rate equation is weaker, although it is still apparent. A significant decline in estimated VAR innovation variances is compatible with the notion that, under the earlier regime, a series of relatively large shocks hit the economy whereas, during the latter regime, the macroeconomic environment became more benign. Although such interpretation is standard in the literature, our simple example shows that also a shift from passive to active policy can replicate the instability of estimated innovation variances typically found in VAR analyses.
As changes in the distributions of the estimated innovation variances to the inflation and output gap equations are large, formal tests should point towards statistical breaks. The first two columns of Table 1 It is worth emphasizing that earlier contributions have found, on actual data, results that are qualitatively very similar to the results, on simulated data, shown in 11 The total prediction variance of a VAR is a simple measure of the total amount of noise hitting the system at each point in time, and it is defined as ln[det(V )], where V is the covariance matrix of the VAR innovations. The lag orders of the VARs have been selected via the AIC.
12 Bootstrapping is performed as in Diebold and Chen (1996) applied to the VAR as a whole. is with a version that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only.
Among versions that allow for changes in equation coefficients also, the best fit is for a one that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule.' While earlier contributions have interpreted these results as evidence in favor of the good luck hypothesis, the instability of VAR innovation variances presented in Table 1 has been obtained within a framework in which improved monetary policy is the only driver of the Great Moderation.
The last two columns of Table 1 display results for a policy shift within the active regime. 13 A move to a relatively more anti-inflationary policy stance, within the active regime, is still capable of producing statistically significant breaks in the estimated innovation variances to inflation and output gap equations. The evidence of instability for both the innovation variance in the interest rate equation and the VAR coefficients is, once again, much weaker.
Our reduced-form results show that, in contrast to the conventional presumption, the policy shift can exert its maximal impact on the VAR covariance matrix, as opposed to the VAR coefficients. It should be noted, however, that our results do not imply that we should now replace the previous, mistaken presumption with the opposite presumption that a change in the policy rule will always exert its maximal impact on the VAR covariance matrix. Rather, our findings imply that the evidence on instability of VAR innovation variances should be regarded as uninformative for discriminating between luck and policy.
Moving to counterfactual simulations, Stock and Watson (2002) and Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) show that switching the estimated VAR equation coefficients between the two sub-periods produces little change in the volatilities of the series. Switching the estimated volatilities of the reduced-form disturbances, in contrast, 'inverts' the outcomes with the macroeconomic stability now taking place over the first part of the sample. Table 2 reports the medians of the distributions of the standard deviations of the series, together with the 5th and 95th percentiles. Results are displayed for the baseline simulation under the active and passive regimes, and for 13 Specifically, we increase φ π from 1.1 to 1.8 while keeping ρ R and φ x constant to 0.9 and 0.5.
counterfactual simulations in which we bootstrap the estimated reduced-form VARs after switching the estimated residuals across the two sub-periods.
A switch in the estimated reduced-form shocks across sub-periods inverts the final outcome, thus replicating the findings of Stock and Watson (2002) 
Identification
The calibration of the parameters of the model implies impulse-response functions (henceforth, IRFs) for which the impact of the structural shocks on the three variables has the same sign under both active and passive regimes. In what follows, we identify therefore the three structural shocks in the VAR by imposing the following contemporaneous sign restrictions:
• a positive monetary policy shock has a positive impact on the interest rate, and a negative impact on inflation and the output gap;
• a positive demand non-policy shock has a positive impact on all variables;
• a positive cost push shock has a positive impact on inflation and the interest rate, and a negative impact on the output gap.
For each of the 10,000 simulations under either the active or passive regime we estimate a reduced-form VAR as in section 4, selecting the lag order on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. We compute the structural impact matrix, A 0 , via the procedure recently introduced by Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2005) .
14 Specifically, let Ω = P · D · P 0 be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the estimated VAR covariance matrix Ω, and letÃ 0 ≡ P · D 1 2 . We draw an N × N matrix, K, from the N(0, 1) distribution, we take the QR decomposition of K-that is, we compute matrices Q and R such that K=Q·R-and we compute the structural impact matrix as A 0 =Ã 0 · Q 0 . Following Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2005), for each of the 10,000 simulations, we keep on drawing (i.e. computing rotations) until the sign restrictions are satisfied.
We regard our choice of imposing the sign restrictions implied by the model as the most natural one. Other identifying restrictions, as for instance Cholesky, suffer from the notable drawback of being false under both policy regimes, and therefore they would make it difficult to interpret the results.
Counterfactual simulations
VARs have been applied to U.S. inflation, unemployment, and a short rate. Primiceri We simulate the model 10,000 times under both active and passive regimes, and for each simulation we proceed as follows: (i) based on the two simulated samples, we estimate two structural VARs as described in Section 5.1; (ii) we switch the estimated structural monetary rules in the two VARs across sub-periods, keeping everything else constant; (iii) we feed the estimated structural shocks to the VARs and we generate counterfactual series for the interest rate, inflation and the output gap; 15 (iv) we regress each of the 'true' simulated series on the corresponding counterfactual series via OLS, and we store the R 2 .
To assess the ability of VAR counterfactual simulations to detect a break in the policy rule of the DSGE model, we also construct a benchmark R 2 . For each simulation, we add two further steps: (v) we feed the 'true' structural shocks of one policy regime to the DSGE model calibrated for the other regime, and we generate counterfactual series for the interest rate, inflation and the output gap; (vi) we regress the 'true' series simulated using the structural macro model on the counterfactual series via OLS, and we store the R 2 . It should be noted that the steps (v)-(vi) in the DSGE model are, conceptually, the counterparts of the steps (iii)-(iv) in the VAR, and therefore they will be used to construct the benchmark R 2 .
As the OLS regressions do no contain a constant, a R 2 of one implies that 'true' and counterfactual series are identical, so that switching the monetary rules in either the estimated structural VARs or the DSGE model causes no change in the series. The 15 For each counterfactual simulation we take as the initial conditions the first p values of
0 , where p is the lag order selected by the AIC.
lower the R 2 , on the other hand, the greater are the changes implied by the switch in policy. More importantly, if VAR counterfactual simulations were a reasonable approximation to the switch in the DSGE model, then the distributions of the two R 2 for VAR and DSGE model should be reasonably similar.
For each regime and variable, Figure 2 reports two objects: (in black) the distributions of the R 2 for the regression of the 'true' inflation, output and interest rate on the counterfactual series in the VAR, and (in red) the distributions associated with the 'true' and counterfactual series in the DSGE model.
A number of interesting results emerges from Figure 2 . First, the distributions implied by the VARs are always skewed relative to the distributions implied by the DSGE model, both for the passive (top row) and the active regime (bottom row).
Second, for inflation and the interest rate, the modes of the R 2 distributions of the DSGE model are far below the modes associated with the VAR, implying that the differences in the DGP are far larger than the differences detected by the counterfactual VARs. As for the output gap in the passive regime, the largest difference between 'true' and counterfactual series is now associated with the VAR. The distance between the modes, however, is still large, and it implies that the counterfactual simulations do not uncover the 'true' change in the DGP. Third, and more generally, imposing the structural monetary rule estimated for one regime onto the VAR estimated for the other regime produces limited changes in the counterfactual series. For inflation and the interest rate, the mode of the R 2 distributions is one under both regimes, and the mass beyond 0.8 is above 50%. It is worth to emphasize that earlier contributions obtain similar results per-forming, on actual data, the kind of counterfactual experiments we have reported in Figure 2 . The results of the counterfactual experiments have been interpreted, so far, as supportive of the good luck hypothesis. As the data generating process, here, only features improved monetary policy, our counterfactual simulations cast some doubts on the conventional interpretation of existing VAR evidence.
Impulse-response analysis
Little change over time in estimated impulse-response functions to an identified monetary policy shock has been traditionally regarded as evidence in favor of good luck and against good policy. Figure 4 shows the distributions of the estimated IRFs to a unitary monetary shock for the interest rate, inflation, and the output gap, based on 10,000 simulations of the model under both regimes.
We find little change in the distribution of the interest rate IRFs, some change for inflation, and a marked change for the output gap. Overall, the evidence in Figure   4 does not point decisively towards either luck or policy as the underlying cause of the Great Moderation. Together with the results in the previous sections, however, this evidence would hardly induce a researcher to identify the correct conclusion that policy is behind the changes in the DGP.
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6 Why do VARs miss the truth?
The results discussed in the previous sections provide an assessment of the ability of one of the best available econometric methods to identify correctly the underlying causes of the Great Moderation. Based on the New Keynesian workhorse model and a standard calibration as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , reduced-form evidence on the simulated data appear uninformative and structural VARs seem to offer a distorted picture.
In this section, we explore why VARs are not capturing the truth. In order to identify the source of the problem, we inspect the VAR representations implied by the New Keynesian model under the two regimes.
Mapping the structural model into a VAR
We solve the model as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . To this end, we define the (1)- (4) with the identities
the model can then be put into the canonical form due to Sims (2002) :
where Γ 0 , Γ 1 , Ψ and Π are matrices conformable to ξ t , t and η t . As shown by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) , under both determinacy and indeterminacy the vector of forecast errors can be expressed as a function of the vector of the structural shocks, which implies, under both regimes, a VAR(1) representation for ξ t ,
The state-space representation of the model in terms of the three observable variables, R t , π t , x t , implies the following observation equation
with We compute an equivalent minimal state realisation (henceforth, EMSR) of (8)- (9) via the MATLAB routine ss.m, and then we use a MATLAB code kindly supplied by Federico Ravenna for computing the finite-order VAR representation of a state-space form. Under the passive regime, we obtain the representation: whereas under the active regime, we obtain the reduced-form: (10) and (11), however, reveals that such intuition is incorrect.
The change in the systematic component of monetary policy from the passive to the active regime has two consequences. First, and as expected, it causes changes in the AR matrix of the VAR. Second, and more strikingly, the policy move induces a dramatic decline in the innovation variances for two out of three series. In particular, the innovation variance of reduced-form shocks to the inflation equation decreases by 65.1%, while the fall for the corresponding variance of the output gap equation is equal to 84.1%. The VAR total prediction variance decreases by 42.1%, a 'Great Moderation' indeed.
These figures cast serious doubts on the presumption that changes in the systematic component of monetary policy should manifest themselves mostly as changes in the VAR coefficients. On the basis of this presumption, results from earlier contributions have been interpreted according to the notion that strong evidence of breaks in the VAR innovation variances, coupled with weak or no evidence of breaks in the VAR coefficients, is evidence against policy and in favor of luck. As (10) and (11) show, however, changes in the policy rule affect the entire structure of the VAR representation of a structural macro model, exerting an impact on both coefficients and covariance matrix. And, the presumption that the dominant impact of a policy shift will be on the VAR coefficients appears unwarranted.
The numerical values in (10) and (11) also provide a rationale for the finding of the reduced-form counterfactual simulations reported in Section 4. As the policy shift exerts its main influence on the VAR covariance matrices, it does not come as surprise that switching the VAR residuals across regimes 'inverts' the final outcome, with the Great Moderation now taking place in the former period. 
Conclusions
Vector autoregressions are powerful tools for forecasting and describing reduced-form correlations. If the task at hand, however, is to explain and interpret specific historical episodes, these methods may prove less successful, and their merits should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Despite being used in many applications, little was known, so far, on the ability of structural VARs to identify the sources of the Great Moderation. Using a popular model for monetary policy analysis, we have shown that VARs may fail to capture the role that monetary policy played in fostering the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years, as they tend to confuse good policy for good luck.
The implication of our findings is that some caution should be used when interpreting existing VAR results. Significant declines in the estimated VAR innovation variances and reverse ranking in counterfactual simulations have been interpreted, so far, as evidence in favor of good luck. We show that these findings are also consistent with the good policy hypothesis.
Given the recent advances in building methods for likelihood-based estimation and models for monetary policy analysis, estimating DSGE models in which monetary policy is allowed, but not required, to be passive has the potential to discriminate between the good policy and good luck explanations of the Great Moderation. 
